

## Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 786

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 1404

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, TU, US  
SUBJ: US-GOT CONSULTATIONS

REF: ANKARA 1372

1. AFTER THIRD PLENARY SESSION MORNING FEBRUARY 23  
(REPORTED SEPTTEL), NIMETZ, AMBASSADOR, DCM DILLON AND EWING  
MET PRIVATELY WITH ELEKDAG WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BATU AND  
OZGUL. ELEKDAG SAID BLUNTLY THAT EXPECTATIONS ON THE  
TURKISH SIDE HAD BEEN FOR SOMETHING CONCRETE. HIS  
UNDERSTANDING OF THE VANCE-ECEVIT MEETING HAD BEEN THAT  
THERE WOULD BE FOLLOW-UP TALKS OF A SPECIFIC NATURE  
(IMPLIEDLY CONCERNING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE). HE FELT,  
HOWEVER, THAT NOT ONLY HAD NO PROGRESS BEEN MADE BUT THAT  
THE SITUATION HAD REGRESSED. HE RECALLED THAT LAST FALL  
WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON, MIETZ HAD PROMISED TO HELP  
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ALSO TO  
INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL OPPORTUNITIES  
TO HELP TURKEY. NOW IT WAS LATE FEBRUARY AND ALTHOUGH  
THE TURKISH SIDE HAD GIVEN ITS SENSE OF URGENCY, THE  
AMERICAN SIDE WAS SAYING "GO TO THE IMF," AFTER THE  
IMF GAVE THE GREEN LIGHT, THE COMMERCIAL BANKS WOULD  
COME IN, ETC. THE TURKISH SIDE HAD ASKED MANY QUESTIONS.  
EG, IF THE DCA PASSES, WOULD THE USG BE READY TO DO

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SOMETHING TO OFFSET THE DIFFICULTIES TURKEY HAS HAD  
TO FACE? WOULD THE USG FILL THE GAP IN MILITARY  
SUPPLIES CAUSED BY THE EMBARGO? THE USG HAD AGREED  
THAT ECONOMY AND DEFENSE COULD NOT BE VIEWED SEPARATELY  
BUT DID NOT SEEM TO BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING TO HELP.  
NIMETZ HAD TRIED TO BE POSITIVE IN APPROACH BUT HAD  
OFFERED NOTHING CONCRETE-NOT EVEN A SUGGESTION OF WHAT

WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE DCA PASSED.

2. NIMETZ REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE COMMITMENTS. THEREFORE, HE PREFERRED TO BE CAUTIOUS. HE DID NOT WISH TO MISLEAD THE TURKS BY MAKING THEM HAPPY NOW AT THE EXPENSE OF LATER DISAPPOINTMENT. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT TELL ELEKDAG THAT THE USG WOULD INFLUENCE THE IMF. TO SAY SUCH A THING WOULD PREJUDICE THE STABILITY OF AN IMPORTANT INSTITUTION. BUT VANCE HAD TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THE USG WOULD BE HELPFUL. ELEKDAG MUST UNDERSTAND THAT BEING HELPFUL WAS A DELICATE MATTER. FURTHERMORE, THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM THE TURKS WERE NOT NOW NEGOTIATING WITH THE IMF AND HAD NOT BEEN SINCE DECEMBER. TURKEY SHOULD COMMENCE SERIOUS TALKS WITH THE IMF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AT SEVERAL LEVELS. IT SHOULD KEEP ITS FRIENDS, PARTICULARLY THE GERMANS AND THE AMERICANS, INFORMED. TURKEY COULD ASSUME THAT ITS FRIENDS WOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD TO MOVE THE PROCESS ALONG. THE TURKS MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE IFI'S. THE BANKING COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT PERCEIVE THE USG AS MANIPULATING THE IFI'S FOR POLITICAL REASONS. NIMETZ THOUGHT THE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE BANKS WANTED TO BE HELPFUL. THEY HAD A LOT AT STAKE IN TURKEY. AT THE RIGHT TIME THE USG COULD TALK TO THE BANKERS, BUT COULD NOT GIVE THEM DIRECTIVES. FURTHERMORE, THE USG  
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NEEDED A BETTER SENSE OF TURKISH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. OTHER COUNTRIES TALKED IN NUMBERS AND SPECIFICS-THE TURKS DID NOT. AMBASSADOR SPIERS ENLARGED ON THIS BY DESCRIBING THE FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN SENIOR BRITISH AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS DURING THE PERIOD THE BRITISH WERE NEGOTIATING THEIR AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF, WHICH MEANT THAT THE US WAS FULLY KNOWLEDGABLE ABOUT THE ISSUES AND DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE WERE, BY AND LARGE, IN THE DARK IN TURKEY'S CASE.

3. NIMETZ THEN TOOK UP THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS. ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS PRIMARILY A PRODUCT OF CYPRUS AND, IN THE AMERICAN VIEW, CYPRUS WAS SOMETHING THE TURKS COULD CONTROL. HE OBSERVED THAT TURKEY WAS A NATION OF 42 MILLION PEOPLE AND COULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE BY DENKGASH. THE TURKS EXPECTED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO TAKE IMPORTANT POLITICAL RISKS ON THEIR BEHALF. BUT WHY COULDN'T THE TURKS TAKE MORE RISKS? ARE THEY REALLY SUCH GREAT RISKS? THE AMERICAN ANALYSIS WAS THAT THE TURKISH PEOPLE WOULD ACCEPT A REASONABLE SOLUTION ON CYPRUS. IN WASHING-

TON WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION SAID IT WAS FIGHTING FOR THE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP, ITS CRITICS SAID WHAT ABOUT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS? NIMETZ'S POLITICAL SENSE WAS THAT AFTER THE EMBARGO AND THE DCA WERE OUT OF THE WAY, SOMETHING COULD BE DONE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TWO YEARS FROM NOW TO TRY TO CHANGE THE DCA. BY THAT TIME, CONGRESS MIGHT BE WILLING TO GIVE SOMETHING MORE TO TURKEY, BUT CYPRUS MUST BE OUT OF THE WAY. NIMETZ OBSERVED THAT HIS GREAT FEAR WAS THAT THE NATURAL TENDENCY TO WATER DOWN NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS WAS OCCURRING AS MORE PEOPLE WORKED ON THE PROPOSALS. IN MOST NEGOTIATIONS, ONE OPENED WITH A LITTLE AND WORKED UP. IN THIS SITUATION, THE TURKS MUST DO SOMETHING  
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MORE DRAMATIC. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION ON ITS SIDE. THEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO OPEN UP NEW POSSIBILITIES IN TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS. MANY THINGS THE TURKS HAD ASKED FOR COULD BECOME POSSIBLE AFTER CYPRUS WAS SOLVED.

4. AMBASSADOR SPIERS OBSERVED THAT THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE TWO CAPITALS WERE DIFFERENT. FOR THE AMERICANS THE FIRST PROBLEM WAS TO GET RID OF THE EMBARGO. THE INSTRUMENT FOR THIS WAS PASSAGE OF THE DCA. AFTER THAT, OTHER OPPORTUNITIES WOULD OPEN UP. SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE (SSA) WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO BUILD A CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF IT FIRST IN BUREAUCRACY AND THEN IN THE CONGRESS. BUILDING SUCH A CONSENSUS WOULD TAKE A YEAR OR MORE.

5. ELEKDAG REPLIED THAT ECEVIT HAD MADE CLEAR HIS CYPRUS POSITION. HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO TRY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. HE HAD TOLD THE FIVE VISITING AMERICAN SENATORS AND WALDHEIM THAT IN 1974 HE HAD WANTED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM WHEN CONDITIONS WERE MORE FAVORABLE THAN THEY ARE NOW BUT COULD NOT BECAUSE OF THE COMPOSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE

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HE HAD TO RESIGN. NOW ECEVIT HAD CONTROL. DENKTASH WAS NOT HOLDING THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY HOSTAGE. WHEN NIMETZ AND ELEKDAG HAD TALKED SIX MONTHS AGO, NIMETZ HAD ACCEPTED AT THAT TIME THAT THERE COULD BE NO TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS. THEREFORE, HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE TURKS DO THE BEST THEY COULD WITH A CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL AND WITH OTHER MEASURES. NOW THE NEW GOT WAS TAKING SUBSTANTIAL ACTION. IT WAS COMING UP WITH CONCRETE PROPOSALS EVEN THOUGH IT APPEARED THAT THE OTHER SIDE WAS GOING TO SAY NO TO WHATEVE IT BROUGHT FORWARD. THE TURKS WERE GOING TO HAVE VERY REASONABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS; THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE REASONABLE TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS--MORE REASONABLE THAN THE GREEK PROPOSALS HAD BEEN. THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT WISH TO CREATE ILLUSIONS AND HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE OFFERING AS MUCH AS THE GREEKS IMAGINED. THE AMERICANS COULD HELP WITH BOTH THE PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED AND THE DATE FOR NEW INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. THE TURKS' SIDE WANTED TO EXPLAIN THE NEW PROPOSALS TO WALDHEIM AND HOPED THE LATTER WOULD THEN DECIDE ON A DATE FOR THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. ELEKDAG, WITHOUT BEING SPECIFIC, HOPED THE US COULD SUPPORT SUCH A PROCEDURE.

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6. ELEKDAG CONTINUED THAT THE TURKS WERE BEING CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE ECEVIT-CARAMANLIS TALKS. THEY WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN BUILDING PERSONAL CONTACT AND ALLOWING AN EXPLORATION OF POSSIBILITIES AND APPROACHES. NO SOLUTIONS WOULD BE FOUND AT WHAT WAS HOPEFULLY THE START OF A CONTINUING PROCESS. A PROBLEM WAS THAT THE GREEKS WERE HOSTAGE TO A PUBLIC OPINION THAT THEY THEMSELVES HAD BUILT. THERE WAS A FREE

PRESS IN BOTH COUNTRIES BUT STILL SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO INFLUENCE THE PRESS TO TAKE MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUDES AND THUS CREATE AN IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE. ECEVIT HAD MADE A NEW APPROACH ON THE AEGEAN. HE HAD SAID THAT THE CONTINENTAL SHELF WOULD NOT EFFECT THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE ISLANDS, BUT ALSO THAT THE ISLANDS SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT STATEMENT. THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF A SOLUTION TO THE AEGEAN PROBLEM ALTHOUGH IT WOULD TAKE A GREAT DEAL OF TIME. THE TURKS GAVE POSITIVE PROPOSALS TO THE GREEKS IN PARIS. THEY HAD SUGGESTED AN ALLOCATION OF 15 PCT OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF TO EACH SIDE AND JOINT EXPLOITATION IN THE REST OF THE AEGEAN. THE JOINT COOPERATION AREA WAS DELIMITED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE AREAS EAST OF THE GREEK ISLAND WOULD NOT BE SURROUNDED BY TURKISH CONTINENTAL SHELF. THE GREEKS HAD REPLIED WITH AN OFFER OF 15 PCT OF THE AREA TO THE TURKS AND THE REST TO THE GREEKS. THEY HAD SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXERCISE COMPLETE SOVEREIGNTY IN THEIR AREA. THEY HAD THEN WITHDRAWN THE PROPOSAL. DESPITE TURKISH DISAPPOINTMENT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SEEDS FOR A SETTLEMENT WERE PRESENT. THE DIALOGUE MUST BE SECRET

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MAINTAINED. PEOPLE MUST KEEP TALKING AT VARIOUS LEVELS. ECEVIT WAS THE KIND OF MAN WHO WOULD PERSIST AND KEEP THE DIALOGUE OPEN.

7. ELEKDAG SAID THAT CARAMANLIS HAD ACCEPTED A MEETING WITH ECEVIT AFTER EUROPEAN LEADERS, PARTICULARLY SCHMIDT, HAD BEEN VERY FRANK WITH HIM. FURTHERMORE, THE USG MUST UNDERSTAND THAT AS LONG AS THE EMBARGO CONTINUED, THE GREEKS WOULD NOT BE FLEXIBLE. THEY NOW WORE THE EMBARGO LIKE AN ICON. IT MUST BE REMOVED.

8. NIMETZ REPLIED THAT THE USG HOPED ALL OF THIS WOULD WORK OUT. (ELKDAG INTERJECTED IT WOULD TAKE A FEW YEARS). A SOLUTION SHOULD EVOLVE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS DURING WHICH BOTH SIDES EXERCISED MODERATION. THE AMERICAN CONCERN IN GREECE WAS TO KEEP IT AS PART OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND IN NATO. THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE. CARAMANLIS WAS AT THE PEAK OF HIS POWERS, BUT WAS SEVENTY YEARS OLD. PAPANDREAOU, WHO WAS ANTI-US AND ANTI-TURKISH, WAS A WORRY. BUT THE NEXT FEW YEARS UNDER CARAMANLIS' LEADERSHIP SHOULD BE USED TO RESOLVE SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS.

9. ON CYPRUS, NIMETZ CONTINUED, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT

HAD DONE WELL. BUT NOW EXPECTATIONS WERE AROUSED ON TERRITORIAL MATTERS. IN THE UNITED STATES, THE MARCH-APRIL-MAY PERIOD WAS CRUCIAL FOR THE DCAM. THE SUGGESTIONS THE US HAD MADE LAST FALL WERE THE BEST WE COULD COME UP WITH THEN, BUT HE (NIMETZ) WAS NEVER COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT THE IDEAS WE HAD PUT FORWARD WOULD ULTIMATELY BE SUCCESSFUL. THERE WAS A BETTER CHANCE NOW. THE TURKS MUST UNDERSTAND THERE WAS A CONSENSUS IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. EVERYBODY WAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE AN INDEPENDENT, BIZONAL FEDERAL STATE AND THAT THE TURKISH ZONE MUST BE REDUCED BUT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ECONOMIC SECRET

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VITALITY AND SECURITY OF THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT COMMUNITY. VAROSHA MUST BE NEGOTIABLE. IT WAS EASY TO DRAW A REASONABLE LINE. THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WERE POLITICALLY VERY IMPORTANT TO THE USG. THERE WOULD BE HEARINGS IN MID-MARCH. A SUGGESTION WAS THAT WHEN THE PROPOSALS WERE GIVEN TO WALDHEIM, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ECEVIT TO TELEPHONE VANCE TO GIVE HIM SOME IDEA OF THE PROPOSALS.

10. ELEKDAG REPLIED THAT THE CRAMANLIS-ECEVIT SUMMIT WOULD TAKE PLACE 9-10 MARCH. THE GREEK SIDE WANTED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS TO TAKE PLACE AFTER THE SUMMIT. ELEKDAG CLARIFIED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY AT THE SUMMIT FOR CARAMANLIS AND ECEVIT TO TALK ABOUT THE PROPOSALS BEFORE THEY WERE FORMALLY MADE AT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE DOUBTED, HOWEVER, THAT ECEVIT WOULD WANT VANCE TO SAY THAT THE PROPOSALS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DISCUSSED WITH HIM ON THE TELEPHONE. FURTHERMORE, TECHNICALLY THEY WOULD NOT BE TURKISH BUT TURKISH-CYPRIOT PROPOSALS. DESPITE THESE PROBLEMS, HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A WAY TO BRIEF THE USG ON THE PROPOSALS. ELEKDAG ADDED THAT BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE FRANK JUDD HAD SAID THAT NO MATTER WHAT THE TURKISH PROPOSAL, THERE SHOULD BE A NEGOTIATION, AND THE PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED BY THE GREEKS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE AMERICANS COULD TAKE THE SAME STANCE THAT CONCRETE PROPOSALS WOULD REPRESENT A START. NIMETZ REPLIED THAT THE US MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO THIS "IN THE RIGHT CONTEXT".

11. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH AGREEMENT THAT A SHORT JOINT PRESS RELEASE WOULD BE PREPARED LATER IN THE AFTERNOON.

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